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GREEN v. THE SUPERIOR COURT:
THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
IN CALIFORNIA AND MONTANA
Christopher B. Swartley
INTRODUCTION
According to traditional common law rules of the law of landlord
and tenant, the conveyance of the leasehold estate by the landlord at
the commencement of the term of the lease completed the landlord's
duties under the lease, and an independent obligation sprang up in the
tenant to pay the rent reserved to the landlord for the entire period
expressed in the lease. Such rent issued from the land without reference
to th buildings upon it, and the tenant acted as a mere conduit through
which the income of the land passed. There existed no duty in the land-
lord to maintain the premises in a habitable condtion either prior to,
or during, the term.
In the majority of states, the law remains unchanged from that of
feudal England. Courts in a growing number of jurisdictions, however,
are recognizing the drastic changes which have occurred in the area
of landlord-tenant relations, and also the constantly increasing shortage
of decent urban housing. Consequently, a number of recent cases indicate
a trend of modernization, discarding outdated and unsuited common law
concepts in favor of a more realistic approach in light of current
developments.'
One significant change has been the judicial treatment of the resi-
dential lease as a contract rather than as a conveyance, thereby abro-
gating the traditional rule that lease covenants are independent. From
dependence of covenants it is a short step to require a landlord to main-
tain his premises, in exchange for the tenant's rent payment. Thus, by
the process of implication, a covenant has been recognized and imputed
to urban residential landlords, that the leased premises are, and will
remain, in a habitable condition. Such an implied warranty of habitability
has been recognized by the California supreme court, In Bank,2 within
the same statutory framework as Montana.8
1Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970)), cert denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970); Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974); Boston
Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973); Morbeth Realty
Corp. v. Velez, 73 Misc.2d 996, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1973); Foisy v. Wyman, 83
Wash.2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App.
1973); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973); Rome v. Walker, 38
Mich. App. 458, 196 N.W.2d 850 (1972); Glyco v. Schultz, 289 N.E.2d 919 (Mun.
Ct. Ohio 1972); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill.2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972);
Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d
248 (1971); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969).
'Green v. Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 10 Cal.3d 616,
517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal.Rptr. 704 (1974).
otnpare CALIPORNIA CIVIL CODE, §§ 1925-1935 (West 1954) [hereinafter cited as
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GREEN V. SUPERIOR COURT
In June of 1972, California's court of appeal reviewed the chang-
ing outlook toward landlord-tenant relations in other jurisdictions and
decided that a warranty of habitability would be implied by law in
residential leases in California.4 Two years later, in Green v. Superior
Court, the California supreme court reviewed this holding and emphatic-
ally approved it, adding further that the breach of this warranty could
be raised as a defense by tenants in unlawful detainer actions, 5 regard-
less of the tenant's statutory "repair and deduct" remedy.6
In September 1972, landlord Sumski commenced an unlawful detainer
action in San Francisco small claims court against tenant Green
seeking possession and back rent due. Green admitted non-payment but
alleged in defense the failure of the landlord to maintain the premises in
a habitable condition. The court awarded the landlard possession and
entered judgment against the tenant for rent due. The tenant appealed
to the San Francisco superior court, where trial de novo was held. In
the course of the proceedings, the tenant submitted as evidence a De-
partment of Public Works inspection report disclosing eighty housing
code violations, and further detailed in testimony a list of major de-
fects in the dwelling including a collapsing ceiling; mice, rats, and
cockroaches; four heatless rooms; blocked plumbing; faulty wiring; and
others. The landlord claimed that these defects afforded the tenant no
defense in an unlawful detainer action; the superior court agreed,
holding that the "repair and deduct" provisions of the California Civil
Code7 contained the tenant's exclusive remedy. Judgment was accord-
ingly entered for the landlord.
The tenant sought hearing by the California supreme court, and
due to the statewide importance of the issues presented, a hearing was
granted pursuant to the court's discretionary powers. A writ of mandate
Cal. Civ. C. (West 1954)] with REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, §§ 42-101-42-111 (1947)
[hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947].
Compare also Cal. Civ. C. (West 1954), §§ 1941-1950 with R.C.M. 1947, §§ 42-201-
42-210. These sections deal with hiring in general and hiring of real property.
Compare CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, §§ 1159-1179 (West 1972) [herein-
after cited as Cal.C.C.P. (West 1972)] with R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-9701-93-9720. These
sections deal with forcible entry and detainer.
'Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal.App.3d 62, 102 Cal.Rptr. 661 (1972).8Cal.C.C.P. (West 1972), § 1170 and R.C.M. 1947, § 93-9711 both provide that: "On
or before the day fixed for his appearance the defendant may appear and answer or
demur. " I
-R.C.M. 1947, § 42-202 provides that: "If, within a reasonable time after notice to
the lessor of delapidations which he ought to repair, he neglects to do so, the lessee
may repair the same himself, where the costs of such repairs do not require an ex-
penditure greater than one month's rent of the premises, and deduct the expenses
of such repairs from the rent, or the lessee may vacate the premises, in which case
he shall be discharged from further payment of rent, or performance of other con-
ditions." The California provision was exactly the same until a 1970 amendment
added that the remedy was to be available to the tenant only once in any twelve
month period. Cal. Civ. C. (West 1954), § 1942.
Uid.
[Vol. 36
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was issued staying execution of the lower court's judgment on the con-
dition that the tenant pay into the court all rents presently due. In the
interim between trials the tenant quit the premises, and the landlord
claimed that such action rendered the questions presented moot. The
court held that the outstanding money judgment against the tenant and
the general importance of the problems were sufficient in themselves
to require immediate resolution of all issues.
In a lengthy opinion reviewing not only the facts raised in the case
before it, but also the transformation of landlord-tenant relations and
resultant changes in the law in other jurisdictions, the court set forth
the new rules for California in three parts:
. . . modern conditions compel the recognition of a common law
implied warranty of habitability in residential leases.8
The 'repair and deduct' remedy ... was not intended as the exclusive
remedy for tenants in this field and does not preclude the recognition
of a common law warranty of habitability
A tenant may raise a landlord's breach of an implied warranty of
habitability as a defense in an unlawful detainer proceeding.'
A relatively clear set of guidelines was also established by the court
for other courts, and for landlords, to follow in the future. Thus, under
the new warranty
... substantial compliance with those applicable building and housing
code standards which materially affect health and safety will suffice
to meet the landlord's obligations. . .
Finally, the superior court was instructed to vacate its judgment
and proceed with the unlawful detainer action in conformance with the
supreme court's ruling.
THE RATIONALE FOR THE NEW APPROACH
The implied warranty of habitability as recognized in Green essenti-
ally dictates that
... a residential landlord covenants that premises he leases for living
quarters will be maintained in a habitable state for the duration of
the lease. This does not require that a landlord ensure that leased
premises are in perfect, aesthetically pleasing condition, but it does
mean that 'bare living requirements' must be maintained."
This new approach to landlord-tenant relations is the result of synthesis
and anaylsis by the court of several crucial factors. Additional support
for this holding can be found in the reasoning of courts in other juris-
dictions. A review of the courts' rationale demonstrates the logic of the
conclusions.
It has been suggested that the common law rule of independence of
'Green v. Superior Court, supra note 2 at 1176.
'Id. (emphasis by the court).
101d. at 1178 (emphasis by the court).
uld. at 1183.
2Id. at 1182.
1975]
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lease covenants may have been an historical accident, due to the devel-
opment of lease principles prior to the establishment of mutuality of
covenants in contract law.13 Whatever the historical reasons, present
conditions no longer justify blind adherence to such a rule. Rather than
land, the commodity known as the "dwelling unit" is the basis of lease
agreements. Consequently, the theory that rent issued forth from the
land conveyed under a leasehold estate, independently of acts of the
parties to the lease, is no longer tenable.
the application of contract principles, including the mutual de-
pendence of covenants, is particularly appropriate in dealing with
residential leases of urban dwelling units."
In addition to reshaping the basis of the lease, urbanization has also
resulted in a significant change in the parties to the lease:
... today's city dweller usually has a single, specialized skill unre-
lated to maintenance work; he is unable to make repairs like the
'jack-of-all-trades' farmer who was the common law's model of the
lessee. Further . . .urban tenants today are more mobile than ever
before. A tenant's tenure in a specific apartment will often not be
sufficient to justify efforts at repairs. In addition, the increasing
complexity of today's dwellings renders them much more difficult to
repair than the structures of earlier times.'
Adding to this the often prohibitive costs of repair, it is clear that ...
the position of ... today's urban tenant is barely related to ... that of...
his common law ancestors.
The "scarcity of adequate low cost housing in virtually every urban
setting"16 due to both urbanization and population growth, is another
factor considered by the courts. In addition to weakening the tenants
already precarious bargaining position, shortages make tenants less
willing to vacate sub-standard housing.
Further support for the new warranty is drawn by analogy from
developments in other areas of the law.
In the law of sales of chattels, the trend is markedly in favor of
implying warranties of fitness and merchantability. 7
In most significant respects, the modern urban tenant is in the same
position as any other normal consumer of goods."
When viewed as a contract, with the tenant treated as a consumer, the
lease loses its feudal trappings and becomes more flexible in the hands
of judges. Arguments in favor of products liability are easily adaptable
to the law of landlord-tenant relations. 19
The enactment of comprehensive housing codes at both the state
and local level throughout the country forced courts to reexamine the
common law. First, contracts are presumed to be made in reference
"King v. Moorehead, supra note 1 at 69 n. 5, and authority cited therein.
"Green v. Superior Court, supra note 2 at 1173.
"Javins v. First National Realty Corp., supra note 1 at 1078.
"oGreen v. Superior Court, supra note 2 at 1173.
"Lemle v. Breeden, supra note 1 at 473, citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
oi TORTS, §§ 95, 97 (3d ed. 1964).
"Green v. Superior Court, supra note 2 at 1175.
[Vol. 36
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to existing law, 20 and therefore housing codes should be read into housing
contracts.2 ' Also, such codes:
. . . affirm that, under contemporary conditions, public policy com-
pels landlords to bear the primary responsibility for maintaining
safe, clean, and habitable housing in our state.'
Finally, since it is the landlord as property owner who is usually notified
of code violations, and the tenant may be unable to even discover, let
alone remedy, such violations, it follows that the burden of repair should
fall on the landlord.2 3
This broad spectrum of arguments covers not only the California
court's reasoning, but that of essentially all of the courts which have
accepted the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability. One further
theme is pervasive, though not always articulated, and that is judicial
sympathy for the tenant as underdog. Over time, courts have developed
exceptions to the harsh rules such as caveat emptor and independence of
lease convenants.2 4 Realizing the inadequacy of such exceptions, it has
been reasoned that:
... to search for gaps and exceptions in a legal doctrine . . . which
exists only because of the somnolence of the common law and the
courts is to perpetuate further judicial fictions when preferable alter-
natives exist.'
The best alternative developed to date is the implied warranty of habit-
ability which, though it is somewhat of a fiction itself, helps to equalize
the positions of the landlord and tenant in a straightforward manner.
Clearly the rationale of the courts developing the new approach has
a firm base in logic and social realities. It has been argued, however,
that this policy-oriented reasoning is the function of the legislative
branch. The courts counter this by noting that the common law of land-
lord and tenant was judicially created in the first place. This issue is
"'Lemle v. Breeden, supra note 1 at 473-474. Thus, the demands for public safety are
best met by the supplier of goods who has represented their quality, is best equipped
to remove any defects, is able to bear losses more easily than the average consumer,
and is able to distribute the costs of improving his product throughout the consuming
public. See also Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, supra note 1 at 411; ' 'By significantly
reducing the economic motivation of landlords to maintain services, [the old approach]
had precisely the kind of effect on the maintenance of apartment units that would
be recognized as inevitable if suppliers of goods and services understood that they
must receive full payment even if they did not perform according to their agree-
ment. ' '
2°Steele v. Latimer, supra note 1 at 309-310, citing 17 AM.JuR.2D Contracts § 257
(1964).
tmId.
2Green v. Superior Court, supra note 2 at 1175; see Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis.2d 590,
111 N.W.2d 409, 412-413 (1961).
2Kline v. Burns, supra note 1 at 251.
4Greea v. Superior Court, supra note 2 at 1174, nn. 10, 11; King v. Moorehead, supra
note I at 69, 70; Lemle v. Breeden, supra note 1 at 475. Exceptions include the doc-
trine of constructive eviction, the covenant of quiet enjoyment, and the warranty of
habitability of short term leases of furnished dwellings (such as hotel rooms). All
three doctrines because of their limited applications and incomplete remedies, have
come to be regarded as ineffective.
'Lemle v. Breeden, supra note 1 at 475.
1975]
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settled Califorinia and a dozen other jurisdictions, and the implied
warranty of habitability is becoming an established doctrine as well as
the modern trend.
SIGNIFICANCE TO MONTANA
The California court's holding in Green has special significance to
Montana in view of this state's development of the law of landlord and
tenant. First, Montana's statutory provisions concerning landlord-tenant
relations were adopted almost verbatim from those of California, 26 upon
which the Green decision rested. The same holds true with regard to the
Forcible Entry and Detainer statutes.2 7 Secondly, although Montana has
not definitively ruled on the implied warranty, the state supreme court
has indicated that a statutory construction by the California courts in
the area of landlord-tenant will be authoritative. 28 Finally, the general
conditions which formed the basis of the new approach in other juris-
dictions exist today in Montana, at least to sufficient degree to be judi-
cially recognized. Consequently, when a case like Green presents itself,
absent some legislative change, the tenant will have an authoritative
argument with which he can seek recognition of the implied warranty
of habitability.
Although the tenant's contentions in Green were based on a non-
statutory, common law rule of implied warranty, the landlord argued
that the Civil Code provisions, which are the parents of Montana's land-
lord-tenant law,29 foreclosed the adoption of such a warranty.3 0 The
landlord reasoned that the statutes, in providing a duty and a remedy for
its breach, were intended to exclude any additional remedies a tenant
might have.3 1 The court rejected this defense, noting that:
... the statutory remedies of §1942 have traditionally been viewed
as additional to, and complementary of, the tenant's common law
rights . . . the statutory framework of §1941 et seq. has never been
viewed as a curtailment of the growth of the common law in this
field . . . the limited nature of the "repair and deduct" remedy, in
itself, suggests that it was not designed to serve as an exclusive
remedy for tenants in this area.'
A new construction has thus been given to the statutes which broadens
the scope of tenant remedies.
A similar broadening construction has been given to the statute
authorizing summary repossession for unlawful detainer.33 The landlord
"See discussion, supra notes 3, 6.
"See materials, supra notes 3, 5.
Noe v. Cameron, 62 Mont. 527, 205 P. 256, 257 (1922); Bush v. Baker, 51 Mont. 326,
152 P. 750, 752 (1915); see Lake v. Emigh, 118 Mont. 325, 167 P.2d 575 (1946)
which cites to California for support of an interpretation of R.C.M. 1935, §§ 7741-
7742, the forerunners of R.C.M. 1947, §§ 42-201---42-202.
2See material, supra notes 3, 6.
3OGreen v. Superior Court, supra note 2 at 1176.
RId. at 1177. Montana has followed this interpretation in Lake v. Emigh, supra note
28 at 579.
921d.
[Vol. 36
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contended that to preserve the summary nature of the proceedings the
California courts have limited the availability of certain defenses, and
breach of warranty is one of the excluded defenses. This contention was
rejected on the ground that this defense is so essential to a just resolu-
tion of the issues that the state's interest in a speedy procedure cannot
justify its foreclosure. The court doubted that frustration of the summary
nature of the proceedings would necessarily result from its holding,
since the availability of other defenses has not caused such a result.3 4
What weight will these constructions have on the Montana courts
when they are asked to decide such a case? All that can be said in answer
is that although the Califronia holding is in no way binding on the Mon-
tana courts, it has been held in the past that California's construction
of the statutes governing the law of landlord-tenant were valid, approved,
and adopted.35 Thus Montana adheres to the law as it stood prior to Green
in holding that the statutory "repair and deduct" remedy is the tenant's
sole redress. 36 But the court has indicated that although implied coven-
ants are not favored,
* . . [they] may arise when there is a satisfactory basis in the ex-
press contract of the parties [to a lease] which makes it necessary
to imply certain duties and obligations in order to effect the purposes
of the parties . . ."
It appears, therefore, that although Montana has not definitively ruled
on the implied warranty of habitability, and although the old statutory
construction of California is still the rule, there is sound basis in Green
and in past Montana holdings from which to argue for the new approach.
Finally, the conditions which moved the California court to abandon
the old common law rule of no implied warranty seem to exist in Mon-
tana, even though population concentrations are not so great. The leg-
islature has recognized the problem:
It is hereby declared that unsanitary or unsafe dwelling accommoda-
tions exist in urban and rural areas throughout the state and that
such unsafe or unsanitary conditions arise from overcrowding and
concentration of population . . . that these conditions cause an in-
crease in and spread of disease and crime and constitute a menace
to the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the citizens of the
state . . .'
Shortages in housing invariably cause increases in demand, resulting in
an even weaker bargaining position for the already under-protected
tenant. Tenants in Montana are no more able than their California
counterparts to make technical repairs to their homes and apartments,
and one month's rent goes no further here in purchasing services or
See material, supra notes 3, 5.
84Green v. Superior Court, supra note 2 at 1178-1182.
5See cases, supra note 28.
w1d.
wTurman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 132 Mont. 273, 317 P.2d 302, 306 (1957), quoting
32 Am.JuR. Landlord and Tenant, § 143 (1941).
-R.C.M. 1947, § 35-102.
1975]
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supplies. Building codes are in existence at both the state and local
levels, at least in the larger communities. Thus even though in some
areas of this state the feudal land-oriented lease principles may still
be applicable, 39 changing conditions in the urban areas are comparable
to the developments which lead California to reexamine its law and grant
the tenant a new remedy.
Clearly Green will be a significant factor in any future litigation
in the area of landlord-tenant relations. Equally clear is the fact that
it is impossible to predict with certainty what the Montana courts will
do with California's new interpretation. Suffice it to say at this point
that a strong argument may be made that Green's holding is logically
applicable in Montana.
CONCLUSION
Legislative consideration of the porblems created by urban develop-
ment may foreclose judicial action of the type taken in California. Al-
though the California court felt that change of the rules of landlord-
tenant law was within its power, it cannot be denied that reform would
be a proper legislative function. Such action was begun in the form of
Senate Bill 643 in the last legislative session, but this measure was de-
feated. These efforts should not be abandoned, since the need for change
becomes sharper each year, and since court action, even if it were taken,
would doubtless be less effective than a clear legislative mandate. Prob-
lem areas such as the determination of damages, enforcement of housing
codes, and exactly what violations constitute a landlord's breach could
be provided for prior to the appearance of an actual controversy, and
the court's burden could thus be lightened substantially. It is apparent
that action in this area of the law is bound to be required in the future
as the population of Montana expands. The legislature should forestall
judicial confusion by a planned and comprehensive attack on the problem
in advance.
"Note that the holding in Green may arguably be limited to leases of urban residential
property, as the court's rationale is based at least partially on changes in city dwell-
ing, which may not apply to farm or suburban residential leases.
[Vol. 36
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